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
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[South Vietnam: The enemy conducted no significant attacks on 29-30 June. Enemy activity around the allied outpost at Ben Het in Kontum Province reached the lowest level in some weeks.

South Vietnamese forces sweeping the surrounding area have established only light contact with Communist forces in recent days.

In the northern section of IV Corps, Viet Cong troops have been lying low, particularly since the announcement that two brigades of the US 9th Division would be replaced by South Vietnamese forces soon. In the interim Communist propagandists have begun to warn both villagers and South Vietnamese Army troops that the US is about to leave them unprotected and they should come over to the Communist side. So far, however, there is no evidence that this line has won new support for the enemy.

[(Map)]

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Argentina: Militant labor groups are likely to use the death yesterday of union leader Augusto Vandor to rally support for their antigovernment campaign.

The machine-gunning of Vandor, the nation's most powerful labor figure, could attract greater support for the 24-hour general strike scheduled for today. The murderers may have been leftist extremist labor militants who opposed Vandor's efforts, under instructions from Juan Peron, to unify and re-organize the labor movement. Vandor was also seeking to persuade other unions to withdraw from the leftist union bloc headed by Raimundo Ongaro and not to participate in today's strike.

Labor extremists may try to blame the government for Vandor's death as well as the shooting by police on 27 June of a Communist union member who was demonstrating against the visit of the Rockefeller mission. Today's strike had been expected to be successful principally in some interior cities, but the leftist labor elements now may be able to get greater support for it from Vandor's moderate followers in the capital. Some student support for the strike is also likely.

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Dominican Republic: Protests by various radical groups against Governor Rockefeller's visit on Wednesday are already under way.

The Peace Corps headquarters in Santo Domingo and a communications facility in an eastern city were bombed over the weekend. Leftist political, student, and labor groups have formed a "Rockefeller Reception Committee" and will attempt hostile demonstrations during the Governor's stay.


The security situation has been complicated by unsettling domestic political developments. The administration's exclusion of two activist priests from the country, labor problems, and the recent jailing of a prominent opposition senator for allegedly shooting a policeman have enabled opponents to turn the Rockefeller protests against the government. Last week, President Balaguer probably gave agitators further excuse to demonstrate by again hinting strongly that he will run for a second term in 1970--a prospect condemned by all opposition political parties as an invitation for another insurrection.

The government has instituted heavy security patrols and posted guards at all US-owned businesses and the armed forces chief has warned that "any subversive attempt will be snuffed out, whatever the cost." The police and army are capable of dealing with organized attempts at disruption by the far left. Students, however, are capable of provoking serious disorders.

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Mozambique: The insurgent Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) remains organizationally intact, despite serious setbacks earlier this year, but its guerrilla campaign has weakened.

FRELIMO, the African nationalist group directing insurgency against the Portuguese in Mozambique, installed a three-man Council of the Presidency in April, two months after the death of Eduardo Mondlane. This council has taken over the administration of FRELIMO smoothly. There are as yet no signs of serious dissension within the leadership, although there have been/reports of some factional maneuvering.

Lazaro Nkavandame, the highest-ranking leader belonging to the principal tribal element in FRELIMO, defected to the Portuguese in March. Nkavandame has been cooperating with the Portuguese in his tribal base of northeastern Mozambique, which is the one area where FRELIMO has remained relatively strong. Although their campaign has weaned away a few hundred civilian supporters of FRELIMO, there are no signs of significant defections by armed guerrillas.

FRELIMO's uneven guerrilla record since February shows that its insurgent effort is still feeling the disruptive effects of Mondlane's death, Nkavandame's defection, and earlier military setbacks. The group has had to reduce insurgent action in the northeastern stronghold in order to concentrate on countering the Portuguese defection campaign. Elsewhere, FRELIMO's effort to retake areas lost to the Portuguese in Niassa District and to expand activity in Tete has shown little progress.

(Map)

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West Germany - Poland: A proposal by West Berlin Mayor Klaus Schuetz that Bonn liberalize its stand on the Oder-Neisse line has drawn heavy fire.

Writing in the prestigious weekly journal Die Zeit, Schuetz argued that Bonn's standing condition that a settlement of the boundary issue must await a treaty ending World War II constitutes an obstacle to improved West German - Polish relations. Schuetz stopped just short of advocating recognition now of the Oder-Neisse line: both sides, he said, should agree to proceed from "realities" rather than continue "to put them off indefinitely."

Schuetz' formulations go beyond the proposal made in March 1968 by Foreign Minister Brandt, also a Social Democrat, calling for "respect" for the Oder-Neisse line pending a final determination at a peace treaty conference. Schuetz apparently did not clear his statement with Brandt or anyone else in Bonn. This has left him open to accusations that he is operating out of bounds, formulating a separate foreign policy for West Berlin, and undermining West Germany's position in possible talks with Poland.

The Schuetz affair comes just before the national election campaign, and the Christian Democrats, sensing a tide toward conservatism, have sought to capitalize on the Mayor's exposed position. Spokesmen for the party have charged Schuetz with in effect advocating a give-away of German rights without any assurance that the Poles are interested in a political settlement.

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For the Social Democrats, the Schuetz affair represents a political embarrassment. The controversy dulls the luster of the Mayor's mid-June visit to Poland. His statement may also blur the image the Social Democrats had hoped to project to the voters, that theirs is the party that is pursuing a progressive, yet still cautious, policy toward Eastern Europe.

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